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1. Introduction 
In contrast with traditional public finance theory modeling government as a 
benevolent despotic agency subject to public interests, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
depict the government as a monolithic Leviathan to maximize its revenue by 
exploiting tax base to the maximum extent. From such perspective, they claim that the 
fiscal decentralization is a powerful institutional constraint on the reach of the state 
complementary to nominally democratic electoral process. Thus, an implication is that 
“total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized…” (p.185).  
 
Numerous empirical tests have been conducted but with conflicting results, which 
show either no significant relation between fiscal decentralization and government 
size (e.g. Oates, 1985), contradictory empirical evidence (e.g. Forbes and Zampelli, 
1989; Stein, 1999), or supportive findings (e.g. Nelson, 1987; Marlow, 1988; Zax, 
1989; Rodden, 2003; Campbell, 2004). Considering the American case overused by 
major previous empirical researches, we intend to offer a new window to examine the 
Leviathan hypothesis by analyzing time series and cross section data of China for 
such reasons: 1) a de facto fiscal decentralization in China is accredited by numerous 
scholars and researchers (e.g. Montinola et al, 1995); 2) the absence of representative 
democracy lends a great opportunity for testing whether fiscal decentralization is 
another effective institutional constraint curbing government size; and 3) China’s 
sheer size permits a cross-section analysis on subnational level.  
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The paper will proceed as follows. Next section presents the theory, followed by 
the section of methodology and data. Section 4 and 5 provide the empirical results of 
time series and cross section analysis, respectively. The final section draws the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Leviathan and China 
In Brennan and Buchanan’s theory, the commonly believed democracy “embodies 
no effective constraint on the exercise of government powers at all ” (1980:7, italic in 
original). Thus, fiscal decentralization may actually substitute for electoral constraints 
imposed on government’s insatiable appetite for bulgy growth. By introducing 
“intergovernmental competition for fiscal resources and interjurisdictional mobility of 
persons in pursuit of ‘fiscal gains’ ’’(1980:184), the larger degree of fiscal 
decentralization should result in the less government size. Although Leviathan 
provides an attractive theory to public finance discipline, empirical studies headed by 
Oates since 1985 have embarrassed its advocators by inconsistent evidences. Either 
various variables adopted to measure government size and fiscal decentralization, or 
different analysis levels (i.e. national, state or county) and dimensions (i.e. vertical 
centralism and horizontal fragmentation) of fiscal decentralization emphasized by 
different authors contribute to such puzzle (Table 1). Here the centralism refers to the 
share of superior government level in total tax revenue or expenditure and the 
fragmentation means the number of lower level government units as a proxy for the 
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degree of intergovernmental competition (Oates, 1989). 
 
Table 1 Selected previous empirical studies 
 
In Oates (1985), two cross-section regressions on 48 contiguous states in the United 
States and 43 countries find no empirical evidence support for Leviathan hypothesis. 
A further study on county level by Forbes and Zampelli (1989) also reject Leviathan 
with a positive and significant effect of the number of county governments 
(measuring the fiscal decentralization) on their size. Later, Stein (1999) presents a 
relative lager government in fiscal decentralized Latin America.  
 
On the other hand, Nelson (1987) finds a statistically significant negative 
association between the size of state-local public sector and per capita 
general-purpose government unit. Zax’s regression result (1989) on the sample of 
3,022 counties suggests strong evidence for Leviathan. Rodden (2003) proclaims the 
effectiveness of prediction of Leviathan hypothesis depends on the nature of fiscal 
decentralization. Only if the decentralization is funded by local fiscal autonomy, such 
institutional arrangement could exert pressure on government size. A more recent 
investigation undertaken by Campbell (2004) also shows a conditioned effect of fiscal 
decentralization on government size, in which the two decentralization dimensions 
and different government levels matter. In addition to above cross-section analysis, 
Marlow (1988) alternatively conduct time-series analysis on data of the United State 
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from 1946 to 1985 and provide supporting result.  
 Besides, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) also acknowledge that an intergovernmental 
collusion would moderate the interjurisdictional competitive pressures and thus the 
effective constraint of fiscal decentralization on government size. “Revenue sharing is 
undesirable, because it subverts the primary purpose of federalism, which is to create 
competition between jurisdictions. (p.183)” To this point, Grossman (1989) finds a 
relative weak but positive relation between intergovernmental collusion measured by 
share of federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments in total state and local 
revenue and national government size so as to support Leviathan theory. 
According to Oates’s (1989) suggestions, a fresh study based on new data set 
besides that of the United States is warranted in order to unravel some of the 
inconsistence in the existing literature. China may be the right case. Firstly, a de facto 
fiscal decentralization has been resulted during last two decades. Local interests for 
development, together with the policy legacy of rural autarky in Mao era, accelerate 
the formation of a Chinese style of fiscal federalism (Montinola et al, 1995). Secondly, 
as Brennan and Buchanan point out, the fiscal decentralization may effectively 
constrain government’s power to tax even when the democracy monitor fails. In this 
view, the absence of representative democracy in China offers a great opportunity for 
testing such hypothesis. Thirdly, China’s sheer size allows a cross-section analysis on 
sub-national level. Its subnational government hierarchy consists of 31 provincial 
level government units, 333 prefectures, 2,074 counties, and 44,741 townships in 
2000.1 
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 Thus, we intend to test the effect of fiscal decentralization via two dimensions and 
also the intergovernmental collusion on government size. Time series and 
cross-section regression will be performed using Chinese data set, respectively.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Time series regression 
Following Marlow (1988), a time series regression will firstly be conducted based 
on the data of total central and subnational levels of Chinese government from 1953 
to 2002, in which the subnational level includes province, prefecture, county and 
township. The dependent variable (GOV) is the government size measured by ratio of 
total government expenditure at all aggregate levels to Gross Domestic Production. 
The explanatory variable, decentralization (DEC), is the ratio of total subnational 
expenditure to total government expenditure. The control variables (xδ) consist of 
population, per capita GDP and the degree of urbanization in accordance with 
previous empirical literatures2. One special control variable added to the estimation 
equation is the ratio of expenditure on economic construction to total government 
outlay in order to capture the transition nature of Chinese government after its reform. 
Such variable indicates to what extent government intervenes in economic activities.  
The single estimation equation is as follows: 
(1) 
where the descriptions of variables are given in the table 2. 
 
ttt uxDECGOV +++= δββ 10
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Table 2 Variable descriptions 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics 
 
Table 3 reports the basic summary statistics for the variables in time series 
regression. The government size (GOV) has a mean value of .24 and ranges from .12 
in 1995 to .44 in 1960. The decentralization extent (DEC) fluctuates remarkably 
from .23 in 1955 to .73 in 1996 with a mean of .52. Although population increases 
more than double of 580 million in 1953 to 1285 million in 2002, the per capita GDP 
rockets approximately sixtyfold of 142 RMB in 1953 to 8184 RMB in 2002. The 
maximum value of urbanization degree is .39 in 2002, 26 percent high than that in 
1953. A considerable decrease of government expenditure on economic construction 
from .72 to .30 indicates the diminishing intervention of government in economy. The 
data sources are listed in the appendix.  
 
3.2 Cross-section regression 
Instead of 48 states in Oates (1985) or Nelson (1987), our samples are 31 China’s 
provinces and the time point is 2000. The dependent variable (GOV) in the 
specification is ratio of total provincial and subprovincial government expenditure to 
GDP3. As for the independent variable, decentralization, we employ two different 
measures: the ratio of subprovincial government expenditure to total one (DECE) and 
numbers of local government units of each province (NUMLG). In accordance with 
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two dimensions of the fiscal decentralization, the DECE indicates the vertical 
centralism while NUMLG reflects the degree of interjurisdictional competition at 
horizontal fragmentation dimension. Suggested by Grossman (1989), another 
important independent variable is to test the influence of intergovernmental collusion 
on the dependent variable. The GRANTS is the share of total central grants to province 
in provincial government expenditure. Four control variables are added into the 
specification. Two variables control for the local preferences for public services: 
population and per capita income4. The variable illiterate represents the mobility of 
population that implies a relative high percentage illiterate population with a low 
mobility. The variable SOE capture the variation of influence of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) on local economic development, which refers to the ratio of 
industrial output value of SOE’s to total gross industrial output value of each 
province.  
The single estimation equation is as follows: 
(2) 
where the Xk denotes independent variables and xδ denotes control variables. 
Descriptions of variables are given in the table 4. 
 
Table 4 Variable descriptions 
 
Table 5 Summary statistics 
 
kkk uxXGOV +++= δββ 10
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Table 5 reports the basic summary statistics for the variables in cross-section 
regression. An astonishing diversity exists among different localities. The government 
size (GOV) reaches high as .65 of total GDP in Tibet and low as .09 in Jiangsu. By 
contrast, the decentralization extent (DEC) ranges from .85 in Jiangsu and .33 in Tibet 
with a mean of .64. Sichuan has the most local government units of 180 and the least 
province is Beijing and Tianjin of 18. Central grants obtain 83 percent of total 
government expenditure in Tibet, exceeding the average level by 44 percent and 69 
percent high than the minimum ratio of .14 in Beijing. The maximum population is 
92,560 thousand in Henan and the minimum 2,620 thousand in Tibet. Per capita 
annual income shows a large inequality among different regions by highest 11,002 
RMB in Shanghai and lowest 2266 RMB in Gansu with an average of 4,004 RMB. 
The illiterate ratio ranges from .04 in Guangxi to .33 in Tibet. As one of the most 
underdevelopment provinces, Qinghai remains a high ratio of SOEs which dominate 
local economy by 89 percentage of gross industrial output value. In Guangdong 
province, SOEs only retain a quarter. The average level of SOEs’ influence on local 
economy is still relative high at .60 in 2000. The appendix provides the data sources. 
 
4. Empirical results: the time series regression 
The Ordinary Least Squares regression results of equation (1) are reported in Table 
6. As in Oates (1985), a logistic transformation of GOV is used to allow the value of 
dependent variable to range over the entire real line. The Eq 1.1 is a simple regression 
of government size (GOV) on decentralization (DEC), which shows a strong 
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statistically significant and negative relation. When control for other explanatory 
variables in Eq 1.2, the decentralization remain the same effect on government size.  
Since Eq 1.2 suffers the problem of serial correlation, Eq 1.3 is adjusted for 
first-order serial correlation by using Hildreth-Lu technique and passes the Q-statistic 
test on the residual errors. The coefficient of decentralization stays statistically 
significant and negative against the dependent variable. Thus, other things equal, the 
more fiscally decentralized a government, the smaller is its size, which empirically 
verifies the Leviathan hypothesis. The significant and negative sign of population 
indicates that the growth of public goods and services drops far behind that of 
population. Consistent with Wagner’s Law, the per capita GDP has a positive 
association with government size but is not significantly different from zero in both 
Eq 1.2 and Eq 1.3. At 10 percent significant level, urbanization exerts a positive 
influence on government size suggesting large-scale government expenditure for 
investment in public infrastructure, city maintenance, compensation for peasants, etc., 
in China. The expenditure on economic construction obviously retains positive 
correlation with government size for an economic-intervention-oriented government 
is thirsty for financial sources not only from supply side to sustain enormous subsidies 
but also from demand side to appease its nature to expand.  
 
Table 6 OLS results of time series 
 
5. Empirical results: the cross-section regression 
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 The procedure is similar with that in earlier section where a logistic transformation is 
adopted on the dependent variable and Table 7 presents the regression results. The 
first three equations are simple regression of government size on DECE, NUMLG and 
GRANTS, respectively. All three independent variables hold a strong statistically 
significant coefficient consistent with Leviathan prediction: decentralization on two 
dimensions negative against GOV and intergovernmental grants positive with GOV. 
Particularly, the explanatory power of DECE and GRANTS is relatively substantial 
which is able to explain 36 and 51 percent of the variation in the provincial 
government size.  
The last three equations control for other explanatory variables and all use the 
White covariance estimator in place of the standard OLS formula correcting the 
heteroskedasticity problem. After such processing, the vertical decentralization 
remains negative effect on government size but statistically significant at .08 level, 
suggesting fiscal decentralization could rein in government’s unbounded stretch and 
basically supporting the Leviathan hypothesis. The number of local government units 
become positive when control for other factors but statistically insignificant, which 
implies current division of administration area is, to a large extent, based on 
geographical principle and not for the sake of introducing interjurisdictional 
competition. Another implication is that increasing local government units alone 
cannot serve the purpose of competition effectively and, on the contrary, induces the 
expansion of government size. In Eq.2.6, GRANTS still retain a positive sign and at 
statistically significant .11 level. Other things equal, central grants to provinces 
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enlarge their government size.  
 Population exhibits a negative and statistically significant association with 
government size in last three equations that further reveals that an insufficient local 
public good and service is provided relative to a huge population base in China. 
Coefficients of per capita income are predicted same as Wagner’s Law although their 
value is near zero. Accordingly, an increase in per capita income would boost 
government size. Three strong statistically significant and positive signs of the 
percentage of illiterate population indicate government prefers to tax most on its 
immobile population. The variable SOE keeps a significant and positive effect on 
government size in that most loss-making SOEs survive on government subsidies. 
Then, the more SOEs each province maintains in hand, the more financial resources 
they absorb, other things equal, the larger government size results.   
 
Table 7 LS results of cross section 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper offers a new data set and window to empirically test Leviathan theory in 
the sense of China’s transition economy. Combining time series and cross-section 
regression analysis and various variables used by previous empirical studies, we test 
the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and 
intergovernmental collusion at national and provincial level, respectively. The results 
demonstrate that fiscal decentralization in terms of vertical expenditure 
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decentralization imposes constraints on government size at both national and 
provincial level. Without a traditional democratic monitoring process in China, fiscal 
decentralization assumes as a powerful institutional restriction to curtail the 
government size and foster the market development. Yet, we could not find an 
empirical support of the fragmentation dimension of fiscal decentralization curbing 
growth of provincial government size. Moreover, the intergovernmental collusion 
hypothesis is empirically verified that such institutional rearrangement of tax power 
would weaken interjurisdicational competition and, ultimately, the effect of fiscal 
decentralization.   
 Additionally, some interesting findings present helpful policy implications. From 
increasing population perspective, the supply of public goods and services is 
insufficient either at national or provincial level in China. If Chinese government 
failed to address such problem, it would endanger sustainable development of future 
China. The positive relation between illiterate ratio and government size fully attests a 
theorem in public finance: immobile factor is more vulnerable to tax. The illiterate 
population with relative less mobility induces government to aggravate their tax 
burden. The loss-making SOEs are draining government budget and blocking the 
allocation of financial resource into other imperative public services, like education, 
social security, etc.  
 Overall, we find empirical support for Leviathan theory although it is not conclusive. 
With regard to almost two decades searching for Leviathan, our contribution only 
provides an empirical result based on a new but particular case of transition China. 
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Further empirical studies should be done to measure government size, fiscal 
decentralization and interjurisdictional competition more precisely. And new data set 
is also helpful to address such “fussy issue”.    
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Appendix 
Sample of provinces, China: 
East Middle West 
Beijing Jilin Guangxi 
Tianjin Heilongjiang Guizhou 
Hebei Shanxi Yunnan 
Liaoning Inner Mongolia Tibet 
Shandong Jiangxi Shaanxi 
Shanghai Anhui Gansu 
Jiangsu Henan Qinghai 
Zhejiang Hubei Ningxia 
Fujian Hunan Xinjiang 
Guangdong Chongqing  
Hainan Sichuan  
 
Sources of data for time series regression: 
 Data of PCGDP, GOV, DEC, and EXPECO are from China Statistical Yearbook 
2001-2003, Table 3-1, 8-8 and 8-14; POP and URB 1978-2002: China Statistical 
Yearbook 2003 Table 4-1; POP 1953-1977 are calculated based on data of total GDP 
and per capita GDP from China Statistical Yearbook 2001 Table 3-1; URB 1953-1977 
are calculated based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 1982, p.89 and 
Population Census of Government 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990 and 2000. 
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Sources of data for cross-section regression: 
Data of GOV and GRANTS are from various Provincial Actual Budget Sheets, 
China Financial Statistical Yearbook 2001; DECE: various Provincial Financial 
Statistical Yearbooks 2001 and Provincial Budget Reports 2000; NUMLG, POP, PCI, 
ILLITERATE and SOE: China Statistical Yearbook 2001 Table 1-1, 4-3, 4-9, 4-12, 
10-12, 10-18, 13-3.  
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Table 1 Selected previous empirical studies a 
 Decentralization dimension  
Analysis level Centralism Fragmentation 
National 
Oates, 1985; Stein, 1999; 
Rodden, 2003; Marlow, 1988; 
Grossman, 1989 
 
State Oates, 1985 Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987 
County Zax, 1989; Campbell, 2004 
Forbes and Zampelli, 1989; 
Zax, 1989; Campbell, 2004 
a Due to enormous volumes of such empirical studies, here presents some of them.  
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Table 2 Variable descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
GOVt Ratio of total government expenditure to GDP in time t  
DECt Ratio of total subnational expenditure to total government expenditure 
in time t  
POPt Population in time t (in millions) 
PCGDPt Per capita GDP in time t (in RMB) 
URBt Percentage of population residing within urban area in time t  
EXPECOt Ratio of total expenditure on economic construction to total government 
expenditure in time t  
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
GOV 0.24 0.44 0.12 0.07 
DEC 0.52 0.73 0.23 0.14 
POP 939.05 1284.53 580.28 224.52 
PCGDP 1601.12 8184.00 142.00 2335.64 
URB 0.22 0.39 0.13 0.07 
EXPECO 0.52 0.72 0.30 0.09 
Observations 50 
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Table 4 Variable descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
GOVk Ratio of total provincial and subprovincial government expenditure to 
GDP in province k  
DECEk Ratio of subprovincial government expenditure to total provincial and 
subprovincial government expenditure in province k 
NUMLGk Number of counties and city districts in province k 
GRANTSk Ratio of central grants to total provincial and subprovincial government 
expenditure in province k 
POPk Population in province k (in thousands) 
PCIk Per capita income in province k (in RMB) 
Illiteratek Percentage of illiterate population in province k  
SOEk Ratio of industrial output value of SOE’s to total gross industrial output 
value in province k 
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Table 5 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
GOV 0.18 0.65 0.09 0.11 
DECE 0.64 0.85 0.33 0.14 
NUMLG 92.29 180.00 18.00 44.78 
GRANTS 0.39 0.83 0.14 0.17 
POP 40718.71 92560.00 2620.00 26455.90 
PCI 4004.31 11002.39 2266.05 2062.05 
ILLITERATE 0.08 0.33 0.04 0.06 
SOE 0.60 0.89 0.25 0.16 
Observations 31 
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Table 6 OLS results of time series. Dependent variable: GOV 
  Eq1.1 Eq1.2 Eq1.3 
Independent variable    
DEC -2.011*** 
(-6.775) 
-1.339*** 
(-3.568) 
-0.799** 
(-2.032) 
Control variable    
POP  -0.001** 
(-2.620) 
-0.001** 
(-2.127) 
PCGDP  3.52E-05 
(1.122) 
4.66E-06 
(0.093) 
URB  2.946* 
(1.682) 
4.410* 
(1.764) 
EXPECO  3.690*** 
(7.758) 
3.268*** 
(6.082) 
Constant  -0.153 
(-0.957) 
-2.365 
(-6.684) 
-0.824 
(-4.300) 
Observations 50 50 49 
adjusted R2 0.478 0.834 0.595 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics in parentheses. 
b. * statistically significant at 10% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7 LS results of cross section. Dependent variable: GOV 
  Eq2.1 Eq2.2 Eq2.3 Eq2.4 Eq2.5 Eq2.6 
Independent variable       
-2.591***   -0.630*   DECE 
(-4.185)   (-1.810)   
NUMLG  -0.006***   0.001  
  (-3.335)   (0.841)  
GRANTS   2.505***   1.013 
   (5.585)   (1.638) 
Control variable       
  -4.80E-06** -8.70E-06*** -5.45E-06**POP 
 
  (-2.061) (-2.774) (-2.524) 
  6.16E-05* 7.43E-05** 9.91E-05**PCI 
 
  (2.021) (2.324) (2.318) 
  6.387*** 6.465*** 5.370*** ILLITERATE 
 
  (6.448) (5.515) (4.652) 
  1.114*** 1.179*** 0.917* SOE 
 
  (3.186) (2.906) (1.998) 
0.039 -1.102 -2.580 -2.455 -2.920 -3.170 Constant  
(0.097) (-5.087) (-13.675) (-6.709) (-8.221) (-7.871) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 
adjusted R2 0.355 0.151 0.502 0.851 0.841 0.852 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics in parentheses. 
b. * statistically significant at 10% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; *** statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
c.  Eq 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 use White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.  
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Notes: 
                                                        
1 Provincial level government units refer to 22 provinces (sheng), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu), 
and 4 autonomous municipalities (zhixiasi, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). Taiwan 
province and two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao are excluded. 
2 We substitute per capita GDP for per capita income due to data unavailability of the latter. 
3 Here the expenditure refers to actual budget in 2000. 
4 Per capita income is calculated on the data of per capita income in urban area and rural area and 
percentage of population residing in urban area of each province.  
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